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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






ROBIN V. WILLIAMS, 
 
               Appellant, 
 
   v. 
 






On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-2789) 
District Judge: Petrese B. Tucker 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on October 6, 2010 
 
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN, AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:   November 12, 2010  ) 
_____________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
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Robin Williams brought this action in federal court, claiming that, after she was injured 
on the job and obliged to take leave, her employer, Temple University Hospital 
(“Temple”), fired her from her full-time position and offered her a part-time position 
instead.  As well as we can discern, she alleges that her firing was in violation of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  The District Court granted Temple‟s motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  We affirm, but on different grounds from those 
discussed in the decision of the District Court. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and history 
that are relevant to our conclusion.  Because defendants Temple and District Council 
1199C (“District Council”) made a facial challenge to jurisdiction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), as well as a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), we take 
Williams‟s allegations to be true.  Williams worked for eight years at Temple in various 
positions.  In July 1997, while employed as a full-time technical assistant in the radiology 
department, she was injured in an unknown manner at work.  As a result, she filed a 
worker‟s compensation claim and went on leave.   
Williams was returned to “full duty status” and “sent back to work” in March 
1998.  However, when she returned to work, the head of Temple‟s administrative 
department informed her that her position had been eliminated.  (A letter announcing her 
termination was actually first placed in her file in January 1998, but she was not notified 
of this.)  She was offered in its stead a part-time, night-shift and weekend position in the 
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dietary department, which she apparently did not accept.  Williams alleges that she 
learned later that her position had not, in fact, been eliminated. 
 In response to her firing, Williams consulted a representative of her union, 
District Council 1199C.  District Council filed a grievance on her behalf.  How and 
whether this grievance was addressed is unknown; however, Williams did not regain her 
job and has not been “paid out.”  Some time after the grievance was filed, Williams wrote 
to District Council and received a letter in response from its president, Henry Nicholas, 
offering to “help” her, but that promise was “false.”  She also wrote letters to Temple, 
which received no answer. 
Williams filed discrimination charges against Temple with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2004.  The EEOC found her 2004 
charges untimely and issued her a right-to-sue letter on June 1, 2005.
1
  On June 23, 2005, 
Williams, appearing pro se, filed suit against Temple, District Council, and certain 
individual employees of Temple.
2
  In August  2005, District Council filed a motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), failure to 
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and lack of proper service; shortly thereafter, 
Temple filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to 
state a claim. 
The District Court then granted defendants‟ motions to dismiss, finding that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Williams failed to “allege[] any cause of action 
                                                 
1
 The disposition, if any, of her prior EEOC charges is unknown. 
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arising under any federal law, [or] . . . violation of any federal statute”; that Williams 
failed to state a claim with respect to any state law claims because they were barred by 
the statute of limitations; and that “the discrimination claim” was barred by the statute of 
limitations.   
II. 
We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s grant of a motion to dismiss.  
United States Dep’t of Trans. ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g, 564 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 
2009).  “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the 
federal claim is proper only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by 
prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a 
federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).   
Williams argues that her pro se complaint presented a cognizable federal claim of 
disability discrimination under the ADA.  We agree.  Although we appreciate the 
difficulties the District Court must have had in deciphering her inartful complaint, 
Williams‟s repeated uses of the word “discrimination,” along with the facts she alleged, 
especially the references to the EEOC and the right-to-sue letter,
3
 were sufficient to 
convey that she was alleging a cause of action arising under the ADA.  Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 The disposition of Williams‟s claims against the individual Temple employees is 
unclear, but those claims are not before us. 
3
 Williams discusses the EEOC only in a “motion to quash” she filed in response to 
Temple and District Council‟s motions to dismiss.  The District Court considered and 
relied on this information in making its decision.  Especially given that Williams 
appeared pro se, we believe it is appropriate to take this information into consideration in 
evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint. 
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District Court itself later spent a paragraph discussing her “discrimination claim” and 
makes reference to federal statutes of limitation in that analysis.  It was therefore 
incorrect to dismiss Williams‟s claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).4 
However, although Williams‟s complaint alleged an ADA claim with sufficient 
clarity to invoke federal-question jurisdiction, it did not do so with sufficient particularity 
to state a claim under the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
5
  In resolving a motion 
under 12(b)(6), a district court, accepting the plaintiff‟s factual allegations as true, must 
“determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the 
plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.  In other words, a complaint must do more than 
allege the plaintiff‟s entitlement to relief.  A complaint has to „show‟ such entitlement 
with its facts.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)).  This standard is not an 
extraordinarily high one.  In Fowler, a case in which we considered post-Iqbal standards 
for pleading violations of the ADA, we held that a plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded her 
complaint, even though it did not establish the elements of a prima facie case, primarily 
because she had “identifie[d] an impairment” and alleged a limitation to sedentary work 
which “plausibly suggest[ed] that she might be substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working.”  Id. at 213.  However, in this case, Williams‟s complaint did not 
plausibly identify an impairment, allege a limitation, or otherwise indicate how she might 
                                                 
4
 Williams argues that she also made a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of denial of due process in 
her complaint.  But, even reading the complaint with great liberality, it is not possible to 
discern an allegation of a § 1983 claim within. 
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be substantially limited in a major life activity.  It merely states that she was injured at 
work but was later “sent back to work” on “full duty status.”  Her complaint therefore 
does not allege facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief.
6
 
   Williams also argues that, as the District Court found that it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction, it lacked the authority to determine her state-law claims on statute of 
limitations grounds.  Her argument as stated is correct; a court cannot decide a case on 
the merits once it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.   In re Orthopedic 
“Bone Screw” Prods. Liab. Litig., 132 F.3d 152, 155 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, since, as 
just discussed, the District Court actually did have jurisdiction, it also had the authority to 
resolve Williams‟s state-law claims on the merits under 12(b)(6), see, e.g., Kulick v. 
Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, 816 F.2d 895, 897-98 (3d Cir. 1987), and did so correctly.  
A statute of limitations defense may be raised in a 12(b)(6) motion “where the complaint 
facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense 
clearly appears on the face of the pleading.”  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & 
Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).  In this case, Williams does not now 
argue that she suffered any harm within the limitations period.  Instead, she argues that 
her complaint raised the possibility that either equitable tolling or the continuing violation 
                                                                                                                                                             
5
 We may affirm a district court‟s decision on any grounds supported by the record.  See 
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
6
 Because Williams‟s complaint does not state a claim for relief under the ADA, it is not 
necessary to consider whether the District Court‟s analysis of the applicable statute of 
limitations issues is correct.  However, we note that a plaintiff under the ADA generally 
has 300 days after an act of discrimination occurs to file a claim with the EEOC, not to 
file a complaint in federal court, as the District Court suggests.  See, e.g., Watson v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2000).          
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doctrine applies to extend that period because Temple‟s silence after her termination and 
the promises of help allegedly made by District Council misled her into sitting on her 
rights and themselves represented a violation of due process.  The Complaint does not, 
however, bear a construction excusing the seven-year delay in filing suit. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.   
         
 
 
 
 
